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HOW MUCH ACCESS? HOW MUCH JUSTICE?
Gary Blasi*
Professor Rhode's provocative Access to Justice' takes an expansive
view of the topic, to say the least. In most common usage, "access to
justice" means access to a lawyer, or what are generally regarded as
next-best alternatives, such as assistance for self-represented litigants
or demystifying court procedures. Those generally assumed to lack
full "access to justice" are those unable to pay market rates for
representation by lawyers. Rhode's reformative vision goes much
further than this, to include literally dozens of prescriptions, from the
modest-making court procedures more intelligible to nonlawyers or
expanding pro bono contributions from both lawyers and law
students 2 -to the more ambitious and controversial: tort reform or
relaxing constraints on unauthorized practice and multidisciplinary
practice.' In taking this broad view, Rhode performs two services.
First, she sets out in some detail all the problems and unrealized
opportunities that combine to produce radical disparities in access to
justice-by virtually any definition of the phrase-particularly for
people of limited means. Second, in so doing, she produces a
maddeningly extensive list of individual prescriptions, most of which
seem plausible when taken separately. In advancing them all at once,
however, Professor Rhode forces us to consider two questions that
progressives often skirt: At what cost? And with what consequences?
In an odd and unexpected way, she forces a sympathetic reader like
this one to reconsider his instinctive agreement with nearly4 all of her
individual prescriptions by offering them all at once and without the
* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. My thanks to Richard Abel for comments
on an earlier draft. Remaining errors are, of course, mine alone.
1. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice (2004).
2. Id. at 85-87, 145-84.
3. Id. at 39-41, 91-96.
4. 1 find Professor Rhode's arguments for reforming the tort system generally
unpersuasive as a means of increasing access to justice, given the fact that the
contingent fee system insures that, at least for people with significant injuries, there is
no shortage of access to motivated and competent representation. In addition, when
Rhode blames the anti-competitive policies of the organized bar, particularly the
ABA, for seeking to maintain barriers to "unauthorized practice," her argument may
have some force with regard to the controversies about multidisciplinary practice by
accounting firms, but it is unconvincing with regard to the kinds of practice of most
concern to people of modest means. She does not demonstrate that the attorneys
who would be harmed by competition from nonlawyers in these areas have any
significant influence in the organized bar. See id.
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means to evaluate either their individual costs and consequences or
their relative merits. She also provokes us to consider foundational
questions we must answer in order to evaluate whether we are truly
equalizing "access to justice" when we implement one or another of
the proposed reforms.
Professor Rhode notes that "It]rue equality in legal assistance [not
quite the same as 'access to justice,' as the book makes clear] would
presumably require not only massive public expenditures but also the
restriction of private expenditures," and that it is by no means certain
that legal needs trump "other claims on our collective resources. '
When it comes to the myriad individual proposals for reform,
however, we do not get a sense of the economic and non-economic
costs, or of the expected benefit. Instead, to those who might find a
given prescription inadequate or troublesome (for example, wider use
of alternate dispute resolution procedures 6 or mandatory law student
pro bono requirements)7
Professor Rhode responds with the
rhetorical question: "Compared to what?"8 The problem with this
response is that in any foreseeable world, advocates of equal access to
justice are unlikely to see all of Professor Rhode's prescriptions
enacted. In the world of action and advocacy about access to justice,
as in overburdened legal services offices, we must allocate scarce
resources across competing demands and opportunities. In order to
develop a workable strategy and a set of priorities, we actually need a
reasoned answer to Professor Rhode's rhetorical "as compared to
what?" A preliminary response might be: "As compared to one or
another of your other policy prescriptions."
In order to make such comparisons, however, we need a metric for
"access to justice." If we can invest the same amount of energy and
resources either in facilitating pro bono work by law students or in
making the legal system more accessible to self-represented litigants,
which will provide the greatest return? In addition, if we take
seriously the overall goal of "equal access to justice," how will we
know that we have gotten there, or even if we are making progress?
When the lawyer in the old New Yorker cartoon asks his client, "How
much justice can you afford?" 9 he expects a numeric answer with a
dollar sign rather than a discourse on moral philosophy. But the
question has another meaning, one with which every policy
prescription and budget allocation must at least implicitly contend:
How much "justice" will this initiative provide, and with what costs,
including opportunity costs? An inquiry into what "justice" means
5. Id. at 6.
6. Id. at 41-43.
7. Id. at 159-60.
8. Id. at 160.
9. J.B. Handelsman, The New Yorker, Dec. 24, 1973, at 52, reprintedin The New
Yorker Book of Lawyer Cartoons 73 (1993).
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leads, in most directions, into philosophical swamps I have no desire
to enter here. I will assume here that "justice" is whatever the
nominally justice-dispensing institutions of the society dispense, with
respect to those individuals and firms whose access to those
institutions is not compromised in some way.
I. CONTEXTS FOR JUSTICE: FIVE EPISODES

The experience of injustice or justice is invariably personal and
contextual. Most lawyers and law professors associate access to
justice with access to a lawyer. Not everyone does. Growing up in the
oil fields of Oklahoma, I never heard anyone use the term "lawyer"
and "justice" in the same sentence. I did hear "lawyer" associated
with "rip-off" and "sell-out" fairly often, generally in the context of
some personal story with an unhappy ending. Those stories resonated
both with my family history and with the oilfield subculture
concerning law, lawyers, and justice. Generally speaking, disputes
were settled by very personal, sometimes violent, means. Family
legends included the night a great uncle shared a cellar with the bank
robber (and local folk hero) Pretty Boy Floyd in the dustbowl years.
When Woody Guthrie's eponymous ballad had Floyd observing that,
"Some will rob you with a six-gun/And some with a fountain pen,"'"
the people I grew up with assumed he meant lawyers as well as
bankers. Justice was to be sought. But lawyers were to be avoided.
That lawyers might sometimes be on the right side of evident justice
never really occurred to me until, as a refugee from graduate school, I
happened upon the Echo Park Community Law Office, in a rundown
storefront in a working class neighborhood in Los Angeles, where
some young lawyers were developing a practice that was completely
new to me. I spent the next seven years working in that office, four of
them effectively practicing law without a license, and qualifying to
take the bar under California's archaic apprenticeship provisions."
The local legal aid office necessitated the unlawful practice by
deciding there were too many eviction cases for them to handle and
Instead, they gave tenant
choosing to handle none of them.
defendants some court forms and a page or two of opaque instructions
about what the law required. When tenants started bringing these
packets to our office for translation into plain English and relating
their stories of landlord abuse, of rats biting their children and the
like, the office agreed that we should take their cases, provided that I
would do all the work that did not require going into the courtroom.
We also began to develop tort cases against landlords under common
law theories that only a naive beginning student of the law would have
10. Woody Guthrie, The Ballad of Pretty Boy Floyd, on Dust Bowl Ballads (RCA
Records 1940).
11. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6060(e)(2)(B) (West 2003).
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thought appropriate: nuisance, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and the like. 2 Our clients generally expressed satisfaction
with both our representation and the legal system when we won and
disappointment when we lost, depending on what we had led them to
expect. Often those who lost also expressed satisfaction, provided
they thought they had had a fair hearing.
Nine years later, as a legal aid staff attorney, I continued
representing tenants in slum buildings, mostly in the garment district
of Los Angeles. To deal with the overwhelming number of eviction
cases facing the neighborhood offices of the Legal Aid Foundation of
Los Angeles, Barbara Blanco (now of Loyola Law School Los
Angeles) and I established an Eviction Defense Center to provide
assistance to tenants from across Los Angeles. With the help of the
first generation of personal computers and three remarkable support
staff, we prepared the eviction defense paperwork for approximately
10,000 tenants a year, provided each of them with a packet of
instructions customized to fit the facts of their case, and showed them
a film of what to expect at trial. We also represented a few hundred
tenants in court, rarely losing a case at trial. Moreover, by targeting
particular abusive landlords and legal issues, we felt we were making
an impact beyond our individual cases. We did not know much about
what happened to the people we had helped to represent themselves,
other than that they never lost solely because they could not
understand how to file a responsive pleading.
Nearly two decades later, as part of a clinical course in public policy
advocacy I teach at the UCLA Law School, twelve students and I
evaluated the effect of the implied warranty of habitability on slum
housing conditions in Los Angeles, as the legal concept played out in
our local courts. We developed a "court watch" program and
recorded what happened to tenants, nearly all of them unrepresented,
in eviction cases. The results will not surprise anyone familiar with
other studies of urban housing courts. 3 One conservative student
who was initially skeptical of the entire enterprise recorded in her
journal this response to her courtroom observations: "Three words:
travesty of justice." We documented a consistent pattern of a "law of
the courtroom" that was completely at odds with clear statutory and
appellate authority. 4 In addition to the "court watch," we reviewed a
12. Many of these causes of action would later be sanctioned by the California
Court of Appeal in Stoiber v. Honeychuck, 162 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 1980).
13. See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court:
Participation and
Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 533
(1992) (describing Baltimore's "rent court"); Mark H. Lazerson, In the Halls of
Justice, the Only Justice Is in the Halls, in 1 The Politics of Informal Justice: The
American Experience 119, 145-48 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) (describing the New
York City Housing Court).
14. Blue Ribbon Citizens' Comm. on Slum Housing, Executive Summary, The
Los Angeles Civil Justice System and the Warranty of Habitability 3-4 (June 15, 1997)
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random sample of eviction case files with habitability claims. The
results were striking: Out of 151 tenants who had asserted facts
constituting breaches of the implied warranty of habitability, the total
number who prevailed at trial without a lawyer was zero. And when
the pro se tenants settled, as most did, the terms were no better than
what would have happened had they gone to trial and lost. I was
distressed to learn that more than half of the all these pro se tenants
had been assisted by the office I had helped to found, the Eviction
Defense Center.
More recently, I was asked by another legal services agency to
conduct a full evaluation of the effectiveness of a new self-help
assistance center located in a local courthouse. With the assistance of
our law school's meticulous empirical research group, we did
something rarely done in such evaluations.15 We developed a control
group of unassisted litigants and compared both expressed satisfaction
and outcomes as to both assisted and unassisted tenants. One result
was particularly striking: Interviewed shortly after receiving services,
the self-help center clients were very pleased. Fully ninety-five
percent said they were either "extremely satisfied" or "very satisfied"
with the services they had received. 6 It was easy to see why. The
lawyers and paralegals in the office were remarkable in their clientcenteredness and supportive attitudes, and meticulous in explaining to
tenants all their rights under California law and local rent control
regulations. We also did follow-up interviews with both sets of
tenants after they had gone to court. Although the objective
outcomes were similar for both center-assisted tenants and the
unassisted control group, the center's clients were actually less
satisfied than the unassisted control group. 7 Again, the explanation
appeared to us fairly straightforward. The staff of the self-help center
had done an extremely good job of explaining to tenants their legal
rights under California law, but they had been less successful in
communicating what was actually going to happen when the tenants
got to court. The unassisted tenants were less well-informed, and thus
perhaps more cynical but also less disappointed.

(unpublished report, on file with author). The full final report was never issued by
the Blue Ribbon Committee because court officials agreed to remedy many of the
problems identified in a preliminary version of the Executive Summary.
15. A significant exception is the research by Carroll Seron et al., The Impact Of
Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New York City's Housing Court:
Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 Law & Soc'y Rev. 419 (2001).
16. The Empirical Research Group, UCLA School of Law, Evaluation of the Van
Nuys Legal Self-Help Center Final Report 7 (Aug. 30, 2001) (unpublished report, on
file with author).
17. Id. at 14.
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II. SUBJECTIVE JUSTICE

As the last example makes clear, the subjective sense of justice can
be largely independent of outcomes or of actual (as opposed to
perceived) procedural fairness. Ironically, as a result of receiving
more access to justice, as the term is conventionally understood, the
clients of the self-help center experienced less subjective justice in the
process. There is a substantial literature on the psychology of
perceived or subjective justice. Since Thibaut and Walker suggested
that litigants' satisfaction with dispute resolution could be
independently affected both by outcomes and by perception of the
process leading to outcomes,"8 scholars have produced a rich empirical
literature on the determinants of perceptions of justice. Among the
more striking findings is that of Tom R. Tyler, evaluating reports from
652 citizens about their encounters with the police and courts:
The findings reported strongly support the suggestion of prior
research that a key determinant of citizen reactions to encounters
with legal authorities is the respondents' assessment of the fairness
of the procedures used in that contact.... Once such fairness
factors are taken into account, there is little independent effect of
the favorability of the outcomes or procedures involved.1 9
Plainly, process-or at least the perception of process-matters to
people. As a determinant of subjective satisfaction with dispute
resolution processes, perceptions may be more important than either
the actual fairness of the process or the outcome.
A largely separate stream of research in social psychology has
documented a widespread "belief in a just world," resistant to clear
contrary evidence, that causes many people to construe events in
order to maintain what Melvin J. Lerner calls the "fundamental
delusion."2 The basic theory, supported by dozens of experiments, is
this:
[P]eople assume that they live in a just world, in which each person
gets what he deserves and deserves what he gets. Should a person
witness clear injustice, this (potentially vital) belief in the justice of
the world becomes threatened. Thus, people are motivated to
maintain or reaffirm their belief in a just world, perhaps through
personal or active engagement in the preservation of justice.
Because the latter may often prove costly (if not impossible), people
attempt to maintain their belief in a just world by simply ignoring

18. John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological
Analysis (1975).
19. Tom R. Tyler, What is ProceduralJustice?: CriteriaUsed by Citizens to Assess
the Fairnessof Legal Procedures,22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 103,128 (1988).
20. Melvin J.Lerner, The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion (1980)
(this book is the seminal work in the field).
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injustice or reinterpreting the21 results of events such that the
consequences appear to be just.
One consequence, documented across multiple studies, is a
common tendency to blame factually innocent victims for their
misfortunes:
Witnesses of an innocent victim's suffering will attempt to
reestablish justice in the situation by compensating the victim. If
they are unable to provide compensation, they will attempt to
as a function
reestablish justice by finding the victim blameworthy,
22
of his/her actions or personal characteristics.
The "belief in a just world" also has consequences for how people
understand their own circumstances. The strength of the belief varies
Strong believers tend to maintain the
across individuals.
"fundamental delusion" by construing their own misfortunes as less
unfair than do weak believers or neutral observers. 3
There are sound reasons to be concerned with perceptions and
appearances of access to justice. Respect for law and support for legal
institutions requires widespread belief that those institutions dispense
justice. If we are interested in maximizing perceived access to justice,
then we have several means of assessing the outcomes of various
Standard survey techniques and attitude
policy prescriptions.
measures can reveal how people assess their interaction with the
justice system. We might determine, for example, that litigants feel
they have had more access to justice if they have been given multiple
opportunities to speak, even if the judge invariably ignored every such
spoken word in making a ruling, provided that the judge smiled
sagaciously during the presentation. We might also increase the sense
of felt justice by amplifying the tendency of many people to blame
themselves for their troubles (another manifestation of the "belief in a
just world"). Though such interventions might increase access to
subjective justice, one hopes that law and public policy would seek to
go beyond the maintenance of institutionally useful illusions.
On the other hand, who are we to interpose any non-subjective
measure of justice on those who seek it? As for unwarranted selfblame, this would seem to call less for lawyers than for counselors in
Moreover, the essence of clientthe conventional sense.
centeredness-by now the accepted norm in legal education if not in
practice-is that the lawyer-client dyad should be guided by the
21. Jtirgen Maes, Immanent Justice and Ultimate Justice: Two Ways of Believing
in Justice, in Responses to Victimizations and Belief in a Just World 9, 9-10 (Leo
Montada & Melvin J. Lerner eds., 1998).
22. Lerner, supra note 20, at 40. For a more recent survey of these phenomena,
see Reponses to Victimizations and Belief in a Just World, supra note 21.
23. E.g., Carolyn L. Hafer & James M. Olson, Individual Differences in the Belief
in a Just World and Responses to PersonalMisfortune, in Responses to Victimizations

and Belief in a Just World, supra note 21, at 65.
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preferences of the client rather than those of the lawyer, at least
within certain bounds. 24 If a client determines that she would prefer
having her "day in court" or a pleasant disputing experience, even if
she loses the case, then that client decision ought to carry some
weight. My hunch, however, is that at least ex ante, people approach
the justice system seeking a result rather than an experience. By
analogy, patients treated by a doctor who has a good "bedside
manner," like clients put at ease by an active-listening,25 empathetic
lawyer, may feel that they have received high quality professional
services. Unfortunately, the objective shortcomings of the engaging
doctor may only be revealed at a subsequent autopsy, or those of the
likable lawyer in the malpractice case that follows. Presumably, we
would not design health care systems based purely on the satisfaction
of patients, nor fail to discipline a lawyer who was extremely good at
misleading clients. Surely, then, when we speak of "access to justice"
we must mean more than "access to the means of feeling as though
one has had justice." In the end, we must attend to outcomes: What
actually happens to those who participate in the justice system?
When it comes to allocating scarce resources for a more objectively
measured "access to justice," there is one area in which subjectivity
cannot be avoided. There is no objective method for assessing the
relative importance to clients or communities of, say, eviction cases or
family law disputes. Federally funded legal services programs are
required to engage in priority-setting among areas of potential
practice. 26 Groups of clients and community groups are consulted.
Invariably, the priorities run to the most obviously vital issues:
income maintenance, housing, and so on, with some variation at the
margins. 27
Having participated in these discussions in a variety of different
roles, I know that there are always unanswerable arguments and
incommensurable comparisons to be made: Securing emergency
24. See, e.g., David A. Binder et al., Lawyers as Counselors: A Client-Centered
Approach 2-13 (2004).
25. Id. at 41-63 ("active-listening" is a technique for engendering trust and
developing rapport with clients (and others)).
26. 45 C.F.R. § 1620.3 (2003).
27. There are potentially means for more effectively eliciting priorities from
clients and others that have not, to my knowledge, been used. One of these is
"conjoint analysis," a technique developed by market researchers to examine the
tradeoff decisions consumers are prepared to make between, for example, computer
storage, computer speed, and price, by presenting consumers with pairs of choices in
which these variables are altered. As applied in legal services, we might ask a sample
of potential clients to react to similar pairwise comparisons (e.g., whether they would
prefer to have a lawyer in a divorce case and take their chances with some help in an
eviction case, or vice versa). Using the statistical techniques of conjoint analysis, we
could map the preference curves (or spaces) of at least the sample. See What is
Conjoint Analysis?, at http://www.sawtoothsoftware.com/qs-whatisconjoint.shtml (last
visited Oct. 30, 2004).
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shelter for the homeless will save lives and make it possible for them
to deal with other things. At the same time, if we do not improve the
educational prospects for poor children of color, they will face an
increasingly globalized labor market for uneducated labor, and many
will be condemned to extreme poverty and homelessness. And so on.
Advocates generally believe that whatever they are working on is
the most critical problem (a belief that is perhaps an instantiation of
the "belief in a just world"). In the end, though, there is no objective
means by which to compare the "justice" achieved in work to prevent
a client from spending a night on the streets and work that reduces the
odds that today's teenage client will be unemployed and homeless a
decade from now. Within either sphere of work, however, we can
objectively assess how much our work actually contributes to the
stated goal.
Before turning to how we might do that, it is worth noting that
those of us concerned with access to justice may ourselves be affected
by the tendency toward an unwarranted "belief in a just world." We
may respond to systemic injustice by working to provide more access
to justice, but when our efforts fall far short, the facts can be hard to
accept. I have often been struck, for example, by the popularity of
information-and-referral programs in situations where there are very
few actual resources to which to refer people. Believing that we are
doing something effective can reduce our perceptions of injustice,
whether or not our beliefs are factually justified. For the same
reasons, we may be motivated to avoid knowing whether our efforts
are effective. This phenomenon may account to some degree for the
remarkable paucity of evaluations of the consequences (beyond
perceptions) of various "access to justice" initiatives,2" including those
advocated by Professor Rhode.
III. OBJECTIVE JUSTICE?

If we are uncomfortable with relying entirely on satisfaction
measures, there are at least two methods for arriving at a more
objective metric for "access to justice." I discuss each of these in turn.

28. For example, virtually all of the evaluations of programs to help selfrepresented litigants have focused exclusively on their subjective satisfaction. See
Deborah J. Cantrell, Justice for Interests of the Poor: The Problem of Navigating the
System Without Counsel, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 1573, 1582-85 (2002). The California
Judicial Council, Administrative Office of the Courts, has contracted with a research
firm to evaluate the effectiveness of five "model" self-help centers. Berkeley Policy
Assocs., Evaluation of the Model Self-Help Centers Pilot Program Evaluation, at
http://www.berkeleypolicyassociates.com/html/work-project754.html (last visited Oct.
14, 2004).
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A. "Reasonable Person" and Market Measures
Professor Rhode notes that European countries typically provide
civil legal assistance to individuals on the basis of the claim at stake:
Does the claim have a reasonable possibility of success? What
would be the benefits of legal assistance or the harms if it is
unavailable? Would a reasonable lawyer, advising a reasonable
client,29suggest that the client use his or her own money to pursue the
issue?

This approach moves from the purely subjective to a prototypical
(and hypothetical) "reasonable person."
Unless the reasonable
lawyer or client would be happy with a satisfactory process, this
approach also moves us in the direction of outcome measures as well
as objective measures, at least in relation to a modal person.
Presumably, reasonable people do not invest their time in trifles, and
do not seek justice for the mere experience of the seeking. A
"reasonable person" standard also offers some basis for an empirical
metric, by setting the target level of "justice" at whatever the justicedispensing institutions in a given locale deliver to the person with the
median level of advocacy resources (personal and available in the
market) in a comparable situation. One might get different answers in
Beverly Hills and Bangladesh.
A "reasonable person" standard does have some limitations. First,
as with all "reasonable person" measures, it assumes some relatively
consistent set of values and preferences across the society. Would a
"reasonable person" hire a lawyer to prevent a museum from
displaying the bones of a possible ancestor who died 10,000 years ago?
Although I would not, I respect the different choices of a Native
American client who might. In addition to differences in values and
preferences, quite often there is no truly "comparable situation."
Middle class people do not confront the welfare bureaucracy and need
legal help to avoid being made immediately homeless. A homeowner
will never be served with an eviction notice from her landlord. A
worker will never face the same kind of trouble with a supplier that
plagues a small businessperson. The "reasonable person" also comes
with unspoken cultural and other contexts.
In addition, the implicit presumption for these "reasonable person"
evaluations is some identifiable claim or dispute with some possible
resolution in the justice-dispensing institutions of society, generally a
bipolar dispute between potentially equally equipped adversaries. The
justice implicit in the image of the blind Justitia, with scales of justice
and sword30 requires a comparison and a metric: The scale moves in
29. Rhode, supra note 1, at 21-22. This metric makes obvious sense in countries
that provide legal services on the judicare model, in which the government provides
funding for private attorneys to represent certain clients.
30. See Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 Yale L.J. 1727
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only one dimension. 31 In this metaphor, access to justice means being
able to put one's case on the scale in a manner comparable to one's
opponent, and without the intervention of any third party thumb.
The metaphor is not satisfactory for framing a wider range of
situations we might reasonably expect to embrace within the notion of
"access to justice." Consider the tenant whose eviction case may be
the immediate consequence of her landlord's economic decision, but
is in fact the inevitable result of decisions in a redevelopment process
that took place years ago. Do we provide "access to justice" merely
by providing this tenant with legal assistance in the eviction case
comparable to that available to a middle class litigant in the same
circumstances? Or must we also consider contesting decisions in the
redevelopment project, on behalf of current and future tenants, long
before any eviction case is filed? Would a "reasonable person" hire a
lawyer to enforce compliance with redevelopment laws before their
violation has had a direct effect on him or her? And consider the
tenants I assisted as a legal worker, perhaps illegally, before the
implied warranty of habitability was adopted in California by the
California Supreme Court in 1974.32 The "reasonable person" does
not generally seek counsel in reforming systems or changing laws that
may, on some distant day, affect him or her directly, particularly when
she is unaware of their possible impact. In some instances, there may
be interest groups and nongovernmental organizations that perform
these functions, but people with the least access to justice also
generally have the least representation and resources in this regard as
well. We might consider adding to the "reasonable person" standard
a "reasonable interest group" standard, but most of the problems of
commensurability would remain.
B. Objective Justice: Just the Facts (and Law)

Another approach to conceptualizing "equal access to justice" looks
to the justice dispensing process. As a formal matter, if the emphasis
is on "equal" rather than "justice," then dispute resolution processes
that are completely random are also completely fair. But in
nonrandom justice-dispensing processes, the outcome of a particular
dispute or legal problem will be a function of several different things:
(1987), for an extended discourse on the history and meaning of the iconography. Or,
to see what $25 (of someone else's money) will buy on the Google Answers research
Brief History of the Scales of Justice, at
market, see Google,
http://answers.google.com/answers/threadview?id=262188 (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
31. Of course, it is possible to frame disputes as multidimensional and thus avoid
the "zero-sum" perceptions of the parties. See Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know:
Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. Legal
Educ. 313, 368-370 (1995); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal
Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 754, 784 (1984).
32. Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168 (Cal. 1974).
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the facts (both known and discoverable);
the law (to the degree that the law yields predictable results on given
facts);
the quality of advocacy and counseling (including preparation and
the capacity to marshal both facts and law in a persuasive manner);
the characteristics of the disputants and other parties (including the
degree to which they incite bias in the decision-maker);
the characteristics of decision-makers (including how decisionmakers respond to various combinations of the above).
In a given case or other dispute, it is often difficult to know what
accounted for the outcome. When my students and I found that none
of the pro se tenants in the Los Angeles eviction court with a
habitability claim had prevailed, it was possible that the law and facts
required this result in every case. We did investigate public records of
housing code inspections at the buildings from which the losing
tenants were being evicted. Those buildings were twice as likely to
have housing code violations as the average apartment building in Los
Angeles.33 Based on those data and my own experience in handling
hundreds of these cases, we could be reasonably certain that a fair
number of the pro se tenants would have been expected to prevail in
decisions based on the law and the facts. Although the few tenants
who had been represented by counsel at trial fared better, this might
have been a consequence of the selective case retention policies of the
legal services offices involved, rather than the lawyers being more able
than the pro se litigants.3 4
Although the methodology in our small study had some limits, the
example suggests another metric for access to justice, not merely in
terms of access to advocacy resources (including lawyers and self-help
assistance) but rather by looking at the probability that a dispute will
be resolved on the basis of the law and the facts. We can say that two
disputants have similar access to justice if each has a similar
probability of prevailing on substantially identical law and facts. In a
given case this may be difficult to judge, but over a large number of
cases it is possible to control for other factors, so that we can estimate
the probable effect on the outcome of any intervention, including
representation by a lawyer. That such empirical evaluations are rarely
33. Blue Ribbon Citizens' Comm. on Slum Housing, supra note 14, at 2.
34. Notwithstanding the popularity of reforms dependent on improving self-help,
few lawyers or judges seriously believe that, when working with the same facts and
law, a litigant with one hour of preparation can fare as well in his or her first
courtroom appearance as someone with at least three years of training and, in most
cases, extensive courtroom experience in similar cases. Were this found to be the
case, it would certainly not be welcome news to the American Association of Law
Schools.
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done is not the consequence of any methodological obstacle, as
demonstrated by Carroll Seron and her colleagues in their study of the
New York City Housing Court.35
This outcome-driven conception of access to justice has two
advantages over a "reasonable person" standard. First, it permits us
to evaluate empirically the consequence of various interventions,
provided that we can obtain access to significant numbers of
reasonably similar disputes or situations. This is the model of
evaluation accepted in many other contexts, notably medicine: If we
take a group of people with similar problems whose other
characteristics are randomized, and we provide one group of them
with a treatment or resource not provided to the other, we can
examine how the one group fares compared to the other. The results
will tell us the value, to outcomes, of the treatment or resource. It
may well be that providing counseling and information to a selfrepresented litigant will dramatically improve her chances of.
achieving her goals in a dispute resolution process. It may be that
reducing the formality and complexity of dispute resolution will
reduce the disparities between disputants. But maybe not. These are
empirical questions, not often asked about these or other "access to
justice" reforms of the sort advocated by Professor Rhode.
A second benefit of relying on statistical comparisons of outcomes
is that we can widen our focus beyond the issue of access to lawyers,
to include virtually any aspect of the justice system that might
interfere with equal "access to justice" in the broader sense of the
term. For example, in observing eviction proceedings for a month,
many of my students noted that a particular judge was much more
likely to interrupt tenants than landlords, and to interrupt tenants of
color more often than white tenants. The interruptions were generally
not helpful. Even with the same access to lawyers (i.e., none), tenants
of color did not have equal access to justice compared to white
tenants. In a given case, an additional infusion of advocacy resources
might equalize the imbalance brought on by the effects of
stereotyping and racism, but the point is that additionalresources are
necessary to compensate for such biases in the dispute resolution
process itself. If we are truly committed to equal justice, it is essential
to focus on outcomes and all the factors-beyond the law and factsthat contribute to them.
C. Objective Justice: Before and Beyond the Dispute
Any more objective metric of access to justice must also take
account of legal needs other than those related to litigation or other
dispute-resolving systems. Access to sound legal advice that avoids a
future dispute can be more valuable than the best representation in
35. Seron et al., supra note 15.
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court. People who are unaware that they have a potential right or
remedy, or that a particular course of action may have serious adverse
consequences, may find themselves in situations from which no lawyer
can extract them. A tenant with a habitability case may learn too late
that she should have documented the problems, or might have used a
"repair and deduct" remedy, both to remedy a problem and establish
a legal defense. Another tenant might have learned that there was
some possibility of joining forces with his fellow tenants to place the
entire building under receivership and pay for vital repairs out of the
owner's equity in the building.36
Plainly, "access to justice" implicates not only dispute resolution,
but also preventative law and transactional expertise, for these also
determine outcomes over the longer term. Finally, a full conception
of "access to justice" would also encompass more than the means to
obtain a fair outcome under current procedural rules or substantive
law, or assistance in planning to avoid future problems under those
rules. Full access to justice also requires the means to effectively
participate in the political and legal processes that determine law and
procedure relevant to future and potential interests.
To sum up, an objective metric for "access to justice" must attend to
at least the following:
1. The significance of the interests at stake, both at present and
prospectively, and access to the information and assistance
necessary to subjectively assess the potential significance of those
interests.
2. Access to information about both current and prospective rights,
remedies, and risks and the information necessary to participate in
the political and legal processes that shape them, including the
information required to solve problems and avoid disputes.
3. In the context of disputes that do arise, access to sufficient
information, advocacy, and problem-solving resources such that the
outcome of the dispute is dependent on current law and facts, rather
than on differential access to advocacy resources or on factors not
recognized by the substantive law (like the race, class, or gender of
disputants). The quantum and quality of advocacy resources to
achieve this result will depend, in turn on:
a. The transparency and simplicity of the disputing and
problem-solving process and the concomitant need for advocacy
and problem solving expertise.
b. The cost, accessibility, and quality of advocacy and counseling
resources. "Quality" here includes not only substantive legal,
procedural, and transactional expertise, but also the capacity of

36. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 17980.7(c) (West 2004).
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those advocates and counselors to fully understand and engage

with clients, groups, and communities.
IV. WHO HAS ACCESS TO JUSTICE?

If the goal is equal access to justice, as framed above, it is worth
asking: Who in the United States currently has access to justice?
Certainly the very rich have more access than the very poor, unless a
particular poor person happens to have a problem that fits chosen
priorities of an excellent legal services program or public interest
organization. The very poor may in some instances have more access
to justice than working class people with incomes just above the Legal
Services Corporation income restrictions.
Those with arguably the greatest access to justice, however, are
neither rich people nor poor people, but rather artificial people:
larger corporations.37 Corporations engage lawyers (and accountants
and others of their choosing) not merely to level the playing field for
disputes, but to help plan for and prevent disputes, and to structure
transactions for optimal benefit. When disputes do arise, corporations
have access to the most experienced and expert lawyers.
Corporations take advantage of alternate dispute resolution when it
makes sense for them to do so (and have lawyers to tell them when
this is the case). Corporations routinely seek not only advice and
advocacy about rights and remedies under existing law, but also for
the purpose of changing law and procedure.
Corporations do not, to my knowledge, often engage in the kind of
empirical inquiry I have urged of the effects on outcomes of relying on
less expensive resources than lawyers. Corporations seeking "access
to justice" generally hire lawyers and do not rely much on self-help
manuals and their lay personnel. Corporations have not engaged in
sophisticated triage and evaluation efforts because they do not need
to. Reasonable corporations do what reasonable people do under
similar circumstances, particularly when it is very difficult to assess the
marginal benefit of nonlawyer approaches to seeking justice: they
hire the best lawyers they can afford.
To bring the argument full circle, then, the most practical way to
operationalize "access to justice," at least in the short term, may be to
equate it with "access to lawyers" and recognize why we are
evaluating second-best and third-best options for those who cannot
afford to obtain legal services in the private market. This does not
mean that we should not make every effort to provide as much access
to justice as we can, as efficiently and effectively as we can. But it
does mean that we should never be entirely satisfied with less than the
37. Legal personhood has been extended to corporations for many different
purposes. See Santa Clara County v. S. Pacific R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (treating
corporations as persons for equal protection purposes).
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goal inscribed above the main entrance to the Supreme Court
building: "Equal Justice Under Law."
V. So How MUCH JUSTICE CAN WE AFFORD?
Could we afford to provide many more people with access to justice
equal to that available to large corporations and closer to the ideal
inscribed at the Supreme Court? We might start by remembering that
corporations exist as legal persons, with the capacity to seek justice,
only by virtue of law. Since it is law that makes both corporations and
their legal representation possible, perhaps we might tax the latter
service, just as we tax goods and many services provided to natural
persons. To be fair, we might also impose a similar tax on the fees
earned by plaintiffs' counsel in class actions brought against
corporations, by a similar logic. Or we might extend the tax on fees
paid by other nonnatural legal entities to which the law provides the
prime condition of access to justice: the right to exist. People would
remain free to avoid the tax by declining the benefits afforded to such
entities by the law.
Corporations in America spend billions each year in legal fees,
which are deductible as business expenses to the corporation. The top
100 law firms in the U.S., according to The American Lawyer
magazine, earned $38.1 billion in 2003.38 The perusal of the website of
any such firm suggests that the sources of the great majority of these
fees are corporations and other nonnatural legal entities. If the fees
paid to just the largest 100 firms were taxed at the same rate as the
consumer sales tax in Los Angeles County39 (8.75%), a sales tax on
these fees would generate approximately $3.3 billion, almost exactly
ten times the current budget of the federal Legal Services Corporation,
and enough to broaden the availability of subsidized legal services
beyond the very poor.4" We might add to that amount a similar tax on
38. Calculated from information provided by The American Lawyer. The
at
available
100,
AmLaw
Lawyer,
American
http://www.law.com/special/professionals/amlaw/2003/amlawlO0/amlaw 1O0main.html
(last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
39. Services of all kinds are generally not subject to sales taxes in California. In
2003 a California Commission proposed extending the sales tax to specific services,
including legal services. Cal. Comm'n on Tax Policy in the New Econ., Options for
available
at
(2003),
System
11
Tax
California
Revising
the
http://commerce.ca.gov/ttca/pdfs/link-overview/ersi/TaxComm-OptionsForRevisingC
ATaxSystem_- 6-23-03.pdf.
40. I should hasten to add that, were these proposals more than a thought
experiment, advocates for increased access to justice would doubtless find themselves
at odds with the same organized bar that has been the most steadfast friend of
government funding for legal services. Several states have such taxes: Delaware,
Hawaii, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Washington. Stephanie Francis Cahill,
Taxing the Law: Ventura Proposes Sales Tax on Attornev Fees, 1 No. 3 A.B.A. J. EReoort (2002). WL 1 No. 3 ABAJEREP 1. In most states, however, resistance by the
organized bar has been fierce. See, e.g., Access to Justice Task Force: Report to the
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attorney fees in plaintiff class actions. For example, a similar tax on
the proposed class counsels' fees in a single class action in California

(an antitrust case against Microsoft) would generate $22.5 million,41
more than twice the annual amount the State of California provides
for civil legal services.42 We might also look at legal fees paid by labor
unions and other large unincorporated associations or by limited
liability partnerships, real estate investment trusts, and so on. A
billion here, a billion there, and soon we would be talking about real

money-and real access to justice, for real people as well as for
artificial persons and other entities that exist only by virtue of law. Of
course, actually securing such a policy would require not merely more
equal access to the institutions of justice as they exist, but more equal

access to the political process that constructs those institutions, a topic
beyond the scope both of Professor Rhode's important book and of
this responsive Essay.

State Bar of Arizona Board of Governors. Ariz. Att'v. Apr. 2004. at 26. 29 n.9.
available at WL 40-APR AZATT 26. Dennis P. Harwick. The Best Thing that Could
Happen to the KBA..... J. Kan. B. Ass'n. Apr. 2003, at 7, available at WL 72-APR
JKSBA 7 ("Fighting against a sales tax on legal services! Just another way that the
KBA is on the move.., to make your practice perfect!"): Robert M. Paolini. Esq..
From the Executive Director..., Vt. B. J., Summer 2003, at 4, availableat WL 29-SUM
VTBJ 4.
What I am certain of now, however, is that we will not see an extension of
the sales tax to professional services, including legal services. And part of
the credit for that goes to all of you who responded to the VBA's request for
vour help in educating legislators on the downside of such a tax.
Id. On the merits of the case for such a sales tax, see Kirk J. Stark. The Uneasy Case
for Extendiniz the Sales Tax to Services. 30 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 435 (2003). and Alan R.
Romero, Including Legal Services in State Sales Taxes, 29 Harv. J. on Legis. 280
(1992).
41. David Kravets, Lawyers Seek Record Pay in Microsoft Case; Ask Calif Judge
for $258 Million, Seattle Times, May 13, 2004, at El, available at WL 58935767.
42. Since 2000, California has provided $10 million annually for civil legal services
through an equal access fund administered by the California Judicial Council. See
Chief Justice Ronald George, State of the Judiciary Address (Sept. 8, 2001), in
at
4,
available at
11,
2001,
Sept.
News-Enterprise,
Metropolitan
http://www.metnews.com/articles/george0911.htm.
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